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Governing multicultural Brussels:  
paradoxes of a multi-level, multi-cultural, multi-national  
urban anomaly 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Updating our earlier work on Brussels as the paradigm of a multi-level, multi-cultural, multi-
national city, and in the context of BrusselsÕs recent troubled emergence as the epicentre of 
violent conflict between radical political Islam and the West, this paper sets out the 
paradoxical intersection of national (i.e. Flemish and Francophone), non-national and ethnic 
minority politics in a city placed as a multi-cultural and multi-national Ôurban anomalyÕ at the 
heart of linguistic struggle of the two dominant Belgian communities. Brussels is one of the 
three Regions of the Belgian federal model alongside Flanders and Wallonia. It is also an 
extraordinarily diverse and cosmopolitan city, in which a mixed language Belgian population 
lives alongside very high numbers of resident non-nationals, including European elites, other 
European immigrant workers, and immigrants from Africa and Asia. After laying out the 
complex distribution of power and competences within the Belgian federal structure, we 
explore whether these structures have worked over the years to include or exclude 
disadvantaged ethnic groups. To better understand these processes, we introduce our view of 
the multilevel governance perspective. 
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Introduction: Multi-level, multi-cultural, multi-national Brussels 
 
2015 will be remembered as a year when the often overlooked and despised Belgian capital Ð 
the real Brussels behind the presence of European institutions Ð was thrust into the news as 
the epicentre of world news. A few days after the 2015 November terrorist attacks in Paris, 
Brussels, the home city of several attackers, was placed by Belgian security officials on the 
highest alert level on fears of "serious and imminent terrorist threatÓ. The streets and 
neighbourhoods of one of the most nationally, ethnically and racially diverse cities in Europe 
were being rediscovered in media coverage as the capital of islamic extremism (Colsaet 
2016). On the face of it, the fears were not misplaced. In a bloody continuation of the 
struggles, in March 2016, Brussels airport Zaventem, was embroiled in chaos as three young 
individuals carried out a bloody, indiscriminate attack on passengers in one of the waiting 
halls, killing 32 persons. Long misrepresented as the grey, scruffy and rather boring adopted 
capital of Europe, Brussels had already been noted at the turn of the 21st century as a 
uniquely rich laboratory of diversity and political change (Favell and Martiniello 1999; 
Bousetta and Swyngedouw 1999; Kesteloot 1999; Jacobs 2000). It had already begun to 
assert its distinctive and deeply rooted cultural heritage and dynamism, and the potential of its 
emerging multi-cultural and multi-lingual future (Corijn and de Lannoy 2000). Recent events 
underline the explosive power of this nexus, while also questioning whether a fragile 
progressive reading can still be drawn out of the obvious threat of collapse into permanent 
inter-ethnic, inter-cultural warfare. We therefore read Brussels as an Ôurban anomalyÕ, as a 
kind of laboratory of the future of other global cities caught between these wildly 
contradictory forces (as in DavisÕs reading of Los Angeles, 1990). These conditions pose 
particular issues for the question of governance addressed in this volume, viewed as we do 
through the bottom up lens of politics and political mobilisations, as opposed to top down 
views of policy making. 
 
The presence of radical Islam in Brussels is only one part of a city with a hugely complex  
tapestry of cultural differences and distinctions, overlain on to a multi-level and multi-
national political space that gives Brussels its uniquely complex identity. As we will show,  
the breakdown in civility at one of the cutting edges of geopolitical conflict between Islam 
and the West (as, at least, it is interpreted by millenarian commentators in the Huntington 
mode, Huntington 1997), is accompanied by extraordinarily creative and progressive multi-
cultural agendas imagining alternate futures for a pluralist and tolerant European future. 
  
Yet, while all this proactive cultural policy is taking shape, a less happy story has continued 
to play out over the socio-economic disadvantaged position of the most recently arrived 
immigrant groups, and especially those with a Muslim background. This has gone hand in 
hand with increasing politicisation and tension around the question of Islam and Muslim 
demands in the public sphere. The shape of these political tensions is archetypal of Belgian 
politics, poised as it has been for decades between an uneasy consociational compromise and 
the threat of national linguistic scission, with Brussels the unresolved territorial and power 
dilemma at the heart of it. During the late 90s and early 2000s, the policy-debate around the 
extension of voting rights to foreign residents had, in particular, already been illustrative of 
the multi-level complexities offered by the Belgian political system (Jacobs 1998). This 
scenario has deepened over the years. 
 
As it brings in many different levels of political action and interaction, BelgiumÕs politics 
combines instrumental considerations of political strategy and positioning, with more 
profound ones about the formation and maintenance of ethnic and national identities and 
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allegiance. This also illustrates well the fact that, what can be called Ômulti-level governanceÕ, 
as explored in this volume and in the recent literature in migration studies (Hepburn and 
Zapata-Barrero 2014; Caponio and Correa-Jones 2017) has long been the norm in Belgium: 
where politics gets played out, twisted and sometimes resolved across a complicated series of 
arenas and channels, located simultaneously at supra-national, federal, regional, provincial, 
city and communal level (Barker 2015). 
 
In this paper, we hope to illustrate some of these paradoxes in the politics of multi-level 
governance in Brussels, as they are manifested through the question of the incorporation of 
immigrants and their children in the Brussels city-region. After a brief introduction to the 
salient political and social facts about Brussels, and a discussion of the application of theories 
of multi-level governance and post-national citizenship to the Brussels case, we will go on to 
explore various dimensions of immigration-related politics in the city. What we are most 
interested in, is raising empirical questions concerning the place of disadvantaged groups in a 
fragmenting, multi-level political system. We would suggest that asking these questions in the 
context of debates about the potentialities and pitfalls of multi-level governance, might point 
research on transnational communities and multicultural cities towards issues that should be 
at the heart of reflections on the institutionalisation of non-traditional, unconventional non-
state political forms and activities in urban contexts. We argue that while the emergence of 
unconventional political channels and arenas may indeed help these groups get some access 
and voice in the political process Ð particularly when they are able to capitalise on crisis-
situation cleavages, and build coalitions and ad hoc alliances with dominant political groups Ð 
the institutionalisation of these new forms of political action may over time also lead to more 
serious pathological inequalities and exclusions. 
 
 
Brussels: geography, politics and society 
 
Any discussion on multi-level governance in a multicultural context should first be informed 
by an understanding of the demographic and geographical context of this complexity. The 
city of Brussels has over 1.1 million inhabitants, 34% of which are non-national residents (see 
figures below). In the constitutional structure of the new federal Belgium established after the 
six State reforms (1970, 1980, 1988-1989, 1993, 2001, and 2013), language use by civil 
servants and politicians is regulated by a series of complex linguistic laws. It is therefore no 
surprise that when the Brussels Region was created in 1989 after Flanders and Wallonia were 
already in existence, it was officially established as a bilingual territory (Article 4 of the 
Constitution) composed of 19 autonomous municipalities (also bilingual). Institutionally, 
Brussels is formally a ÒRegion-cityÓ (Brussels Capital Region) which is placed on a par with 
the unilingual Regions of Flanders and Wallonia (Hooghe 1991). It also has its own relations 
with supra-national organisations such as the EU in policy areas where it has devoluted 
competences (Hooghe 1995).The very existence of an independent Brussels city-region had 
been heavily questioned in the past and it remains so to a certain extent by those who would 
prefer a cooperative management by the two dominant players of BelgiumÕs federalism: 
Flanders and Wallonia. Nevertheless, Brussels has enjoyed since 1989 its own government 
and parliament which has exclusive competences over a broad range of issues linked to the 
economy, urban planning, mobility, education, for example. After 2014, it has further 
increased its autonomy by receiving new competencies and new financial means. In 2016, the 
budget of the Brussels Capital Region in fact amounted to 4 billion Euros.   
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In the constitutional arrangement, there is a complicated distribution of competencies across 
the different political levels and arenas, which is made further unclear by the fact that there is 
an asymmetrical match of territory and competencies over certain questions. The Flemish 
speaking population in Brussels is considered part of the Flemish subnational community, 
and the region locates its headquarters in the capital Ð despite Brussels not being part of the 
Flemish region. The French speaking Bruxellois meanwhile, are quite distinct from the 
Walloon subnational community, and Walloon and Brussels powers and competencies thus 
do not overlap. This has important consequences in areas of policy such as education which 
fall under the remit of the community not regional powers. 
 
The city was historically Flemish, but is nowadays dominantly Francophone, with an 
officially estimated ratio (among resident Belgian citizens; the proportion may be different 
for non-nationals) of about 10:1 French speaking to Flemish (see Lambert and Lohle-Tart 
2010). The actual population of each is unclear and controversial, as is any denomination by 
language; all linguistic census taking was discontinued in the 1960s because of its explosive 
consequences for political struggle in the city. The best guide seems to be the numbers of 
votes cast in elections, where voters choose between separate linguistically-divided lists of 
candidates. In the 2014 regional elections, Flemish voters accounted for 11.5% of the vote.  
*** 
Population Figures 2015 (Brussels-Capital Region) 
 
       2015 
 
Belgians      776,447 
       66.08% 
 
 
Non-nationals total     398,726 
       33,92% 
 
Total population     1,175,173 
       100% 
Source: UNIA 
********** 
 
The status and future of Brussels has always been an issue at the heart of Belgian politics. 
Geographically, the city is entirely located in Flanders, and yet has always been ruled by a 
French speaking elite. Over the years, it has increased its autonomy from the rest of the 
country, in economic, political and linguistic terms. The creeping verfransing 
(Frenchification) of the city is a constant source of anger to Flemish leaders, who control the 
surrounding suburbs of the city, and which have all strengthened their unilingual public 
administration. Meanwhile, BrusselsÕ economic success relative to Wallonia, its federal 
autonomy, and the emergence in the course of the last two decades of a distinct identity of 
Bruxellois apart from Wallons, has given its French speaking population a different set of 
political priorities to their cousins to the south. It should be pointed out as a caveat that the 
economic situation of Brussels is rather ambiguous in this respect. On the whole, the Brussels 
Region is one of the wealthiest regions of the European Union in terms of output production 
(Vandermotten 2014). On the other hand the number of poor living there rates very high as a 
third of the city's population lives under the poverty thresholds (Observatoire de la Sant et 
du Social de Bruxelles-Capitale 2015). The explosive nature of the Brussels question has put 
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it at the heart of nearly all regionalisation and federalisation negotiations of the past. One of 
the major achievements of the sixth institutional reform (2013) was to succeed in coming up 
with a legal and financial arrangement which, for a time at least, put Brussels more off than 
on the political agenda. 
 
One of the central problems about Brussels has also been its steady urban expansion, both 
internally and into its periphery areas. Officially the bounds of the city have been set at the 
borders of the 19 municipalities that make up the city, but its spreading influence has caused 
the periphery area to be a flashpoint of Francophone-Flemish conflicts and negotiations. The 
most heated tensions over the ethno-cultural divide have come in municipalities with a 
special linguistic status in the periphery of Brussels, where a majority or a large minority of 
French-speaking population finds itself under Flemish administration, and is able to mobilise 
the linguistically separate political parties and media around this single burning issue. The 
sixth State reform (2012-2014) has relieved these tensions for the time being. By splitting up 
the old electoral and judicial districts crossing the boundaries of Brussels onto the Flemish 
unilingual region of Halle and Vilvoorde, a solution was eventually found to this long lasting 
controversy (Blero 2015). At the same time, other conflicting points were addressed through 
a complex set of measures of minority protection for French-speakers living in the Flemish 
periphery of Brussels. Some of the adjacent periphery municipalities have to provide special 
linguistic facilities for their French residents, given that they are officially part of Flanders. 
The bargaining issue of potentially withdrawing these linguistic allowances had always been 
a key point in negotiations, and the sixth state reform did not cancel but consolidated them.  
 
The solution in the Brussels Region itself has been to institutionalise bilingualism at all 
levels, and to reproduce throughout political and administrative institutions a formalised list-
based joint representation, in which the Flemish are usually lightly over-represented. To make 
it clearer, bilingualism means that the state institutions are obliged to address the citizens 
either in French or in Flemish. It does not mean that the civil servants are fluent in both 
languages. The main ruling body of the city is the Brussels Parliament, which has 89 
members (currently 72 French members and 17 Flemish). In addition special rules ensure that 
no decisions can be made which override the wishes of the minority, and there is an official 
Ôalarm bellÕ system that can indefinitely stop any decision which the minority deems to be 
unacceptable to their interests. This pushes representatives to seek a high level of consensus 
in all initial bargaining. Within the city, the 19 individual communes each then have their 
own administrative status and powers; each indeed has its own distinct identity, built around 
having their own mayor, city council, administration, police force, schools, etc.  
 
Finally, the high number of non-national and immigrant residents give Brussels a distinct, 
international and globalised feel of its own, that only extends and deepens the impact that the 
location of the main European Union institutions here has had on the city (Favell 1998; 
Corijn et al. 2009). The 66% national Belgian population are thus joined ever more visibly by 
its large minority of foreign residents, made up of a EU-centred pan-European elite, NATO 
personnel, multinational elite working for transnational corporations, and very sizable 
numbers of immigrant Italians, Spanish, Turkish, Moroccans and Congolese, most of whom 
came originally either as part of state-sponsored guest worker programmes or as part of 
Belgian post-colonial arrangements, over a number of decades. The share of foreign residents 
in the total population of Brussels is three times higher than in the country and recent flows of 
asylum seekers, family migrants and illegal immigrants have increased the multicultural 
character of Brussels further. About 170 nationalities are today represented in the Brussels 
region. This has led to certain neighbourhoods of some municipalities becoming majority 
7 
 
non-national resident, especially given the strong concentration of both EU elites and 
immigrant minorities in particular areas of the city. Turks and Moroccans have long been 
overrepresented in the populations of the old north and south west industrial belt adjacent to 
the city centre: the communes of Saint-Josse, Schaarbeek, Koekelberg, Molenbeek and 
Eastern parts of Anderlecht. There is a strong pocket of Congolese in Ixelles, alongside the 
EU elite who also move out East into the suburbs beyond the EU centred area around 
Schuman into Etterbeek and Woluwe Saint-Pierre. Other parts of the city remain often 
exclusively white and Belgian, and lack contact with the culturally diverse part of the 
population. 
 
 
Conceptualising multi-level governance: the questions raised 
 
To better understand national and ethnic politics in Brussels Ð as both a distinct 
administrative region of Belgium, and the putative capital of the European Union Ð we 
suggest that the concept of multi-level governance can be applied to the case, and combined 
with other theories of ethnic mobilisation and the multicultural society. The multi-level 
governance approach was initially developed in the 1990s by scholars in the field of 
European Union studies to account for the development of new state and non-state political 
structures that distribute traditionally centralised powers over a range of new institutions at 
different levels of the polity. Typically, they are said to be non-hierarchical and essentially 
contested in nature, and may often lead to new forms of political representation and 
mobilisation (on theories of multi-level governance, see Hix 1998; Marks et al 1996; Hooghe 
1998). Looked at this way, Belgian regionalist and federalist solutions to its inter-community 
tensions and power struggles, could be seen to have institutionalised a permanent multi-level 
situation in which powers and competencies are shared between the federal state and the 
different regional, provincial, city and communal levels (Deschouwer 1994). These distinct 
levels interlock and overlap in various ways, producing different kinds of access points for 
actors and the expression of interests, which also widen the potential forms of interest 
representation and aggregation, enabling new forms of non-traditional and unconventional 
political activity to find a place and take root (see also Veny and Jacobs 2014). A recent 
literature, reflected in this volume, has picked up the concept of multi-level governance as an 
appropriate framework for discussing the intersection of immigrant and minority 
mobilisations, conflicts and incorporation, nested in urban, regional, national, and macro-
regional and global scales (Pierre 2011; on scales, see Brenner 2004). 
 
Overlaid onto this situation, we find the growing influence of European Union level legal and 
political institutions. This combination of factors generates what is in the case of Belgium 
perhaps the most advanced exemplar of multi-level governance in Europe. Other features of 
multi-level governance are clearly apparent in the Brussels context. Political actors and 
interest groups in Brussels enjoy the constant incentive to search out and try different levels 
on which to pursue interests and claims, thus leading to a great deal of cross-level 
competition. In this context, informal ties and networks have a very important role, caused by 
the behind-closed doors nature by which many proposals are put forward and decisions get 
made (Hooghe, 2012). And, as BelgiumÕs federalism is based on a combination of exclusive 
and shared competences, there may seem to exist an unclear hierarchy of powers; it is indeed 
impossible to keep different levels from spilling over, thus opening up the possibility of 
tensions and political activity between and across the levels, and the opening up of 
opportunities to other interested parties who might normally be marginalised by conventional 
political parties and channels.  
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As far as immigration politics is concerned, the important parts of debates on multi-level 
governance are those elements which discuss the role of outside or marginal groups, and how 
they use contentious politics or unconventional political activity to force a place in the 
political process (Tarrow 1995, 1994; Marks and MacAdam 1996; see Zapata-Barrero and 
Barker 2014). The multi-level governance perspective indeed rests many of its claims about 
the potential democratic benefits of these new modes of politics Ôbeyond the stateÕ: on the 
fact that the multi-level, non-hierarchical powers and competencies it institutes may create 
new kinds of opportunities for entrepreneurial marginal groups. It is suggested they may be 
able to achieve interest representation in these new situations, which normally would have 
been impossible through traditional hierarchical channels of party and government 
representation. In their studies of the differences between different types of campaign 
organisations in the new European context, such as NGOs, international protest groups, trades 
unions and regionalist movements, Marks and McAdam (1996) concluded that while new 
opportunities are certainly opened up, the differences in access to the policy field are also as 
important. This can be explained by different structural factors about which types of 
collective action and organisational forms suit best the new transnational arena, as well as the 
historical embeddedness of some groups in hierarchical, national-level bargaining patterns. 
The different resources that distinct campaign groups can call upon then in turn have 
implications for the capacity of groups to organise their interests in novel situations where the 
exact distribution of powers and competencies is not clear.  
 
What is interesting here, is to ask what this tells about the possible institutionalisation of 
political action and organisational forms that fall outside of campaigning oriented towards 
traditional national government and party-political channels. In the social movements 
literature, this indeed has big historical connotations, because of the claims by these writers 
that liberal-democratic nation-states have built themselves Ð and undergone progressive 
reform Ð precisely through the motion of incorporating marginal groups contentious 
campaigners into the traditional political game (McAdam and al 1996). The organisation of 
non-orthodox or marginal interests is therefore an important litmus test of the democratic 
capability of a political system to listen to unrepresented and marginalised political voices. 
The question in the context of a multi-level system is what happens to this idea of state-
building when there is no single unitary state Ð and hence no ordered system and hierarchy of 
parties and institutions, and ultimately norms or values Ð into which new groups might be 
integrated. In other words, what consequences will incorporation into a fragmented system 
have on the integration of these marginal groups, which will surely only be partial and 
incomplete? We must assume that some sort of institutionalisation of norms, routines and 
practices will still presumably take place; but how will this match with the desired democratic 
incorporation of groups envisaged in the building of the old-fashioned unitary nation-state 
and political system? 
 
What might have held for the working classes, women and social movements in the past (in 
the classic Marshallian view, see Guiraudon 1998), may not always hold for immigrant and 
ethnic minority groups, who are arguably the most structurally disadvantaged group in a 
modern polity such as Brussels Ð especially given that a large part of these groups have only 
recently acquired formal, though incomplete, political rights and citizenship status. Belgium 
has slowly opened up access to citizenship for second generation and third generation 
immigrants, and the number of voters with an ethnic minority background has significantly 
increased between 1999 and 2012, during which Belgium adopted a very liberal nationality 
law which witnessed quite intense levels of naturalisation (Wautelet and Collienne 2014). It 
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was revised in a restrictive sense after thirteen years, imposing economic and linguistic 
integration criteria, which brought the law more into line with more selective policies in other 
countries (Foblets et al. 2013). For these reasons, formal political participation is therefore 
now a channel of empowerment which should not be neglected (this question is dealt with 
elsewhere; see for example Martiniello and Hily 1998a). Non-nationals, on the other hand, 
might be able to mobilise other resources because of their cultural or socio-economic 
particularities. Yet in other ways, they are unable even to mobilise directly because of their 
formal status, and historically have often had to have their interests represented through elite 
advocacy, and go-between campaigning groups, which themselves may not share the same 
interests as those they are representing. Political  parties meanwhile may offer openings, but 
also seek to co-opt and use the immigrant voice for their own interests (Martiniello 1992).  
 
Before concluding negatively on these structural factors affecting immigrants ability to 
mobilise and see their interest represented, a slightly different spin may also been given to the 
Ôbeyond the nation-stateÕ hypothesis, by cross-referencing the multi-level governance 
approach with the new political sociology of post-national membership and citizenship, 
especially the early work of Yasemin Soysal (1994). In her account of the transnationalisation 
of immigration politics, she discusses how immigrant political action is increasingly 
grounded Ð and given legitimacy Ð in a wider international context, by its reference to 
international norms and institutions and legal powers at the transnational level. Immigrants 
claim social and political rights in virtue of the idea of universal personhood, not national 
citizenship of a particular state, and the pro-active role of institutions such as the European 
Union often cut out the nation-state level entirely, combining with city and regional levels to 
offer new political channels for these groups. This loss of national sovereignty is 
compounded by the increasing autonomy and freedom of transnational business and the 
economic sphere from government control, creating a global economic system within which 
immigrants are well placed to pursue transnational interests and cultural agendas that fall far 
outside the range of the traditional nation state context. The question that follows from this is 
whether in shifting and devolving such powers Ôup, down and outÕ the state is really Ôlosing 
controlÕ as questioned by Sassen (1995), or whether these new social and political institutions 
are in fact new forms of state control, in which the different levels are harnessed to enable 
continued state organisation of interests and powers (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). 
 
Our primary interest in this paper is not to show that the multi-level governance perspective 
applies to the Brussels situation: by itself a relatively unproblematic claim. Rather, we are 
interested in testing the different theoretical possibilities suggested by the opening up of new 
forms of political access and participation, and whether they have indeed opened new 
opportunities or exacerbate structural factors of exclusion. This then will allow us to broach 
the important normative question about the democratic merits of a such a multi-level 
situation: how are the interests of immigrants being organised and represented; and what are 
the consequences of their being forced into exploring non-conventional political forms and 
channels? Can these non-conventional forms take pluralist, civil, constructive forms, or will 
they necessarily devolve into conflict and violence? Answering these questions will also take 
us further to understanding the institutionalisation of new non-state forms, and whether multi-
level governance may offers a new form of democratic political organisation and governance. 
 
Paradoxes of immigration politics in Brussels 
 
The answer to these questions will be highly ambiguous. There have been several examples 
of intra-community tension (i.e. Flemish vs. Francophones) in Brussels enabling and 
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encouraging new types of immigrant ethnic minority opportunities and political voice; but 
also evidence that the given institutional structure and biases reconfirm inequalities, and may 
have also contributed to pathological forms of political activity and expression among 
marginalised groups. Here, in brief, we run through four dimensions of these paradoxes. 
 
Political participation in all its forms 
 
Whatever the reality of unconventional poltical channels, it is still a fact that immigrants and 
their offspring often have a disadvantaged and very segmented access to the political arena 
(Swyngedouw et al 1999). While the typical older generation of industrial immigrants from 
Italy, Spain Morocco or Turkey have increased their participation by taking on, in large 
numbers, naturalisation opportunities, more recently arrived groups such as Congolese, 
Guineans, Brazilian or Indians have very limited political rights in the city, and are thus 
straightforwardly excluded from many (not all) conventional channels of participation, 
representation and welfare distribution. To some extent this is mitigated by the fact that a 
range of social rights attached to residence are available to legally resident immigrants in the 
city, but the basic message here is stark. A large proportion of immigrant foreigners in 
Belgium have not yet been naturalised (still 40% according to the monitoring implemented by 
the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Migration Policy Group 
(MPG) through MIPEX [www.mipex.eu/belgium]), despite the liberalisation of naturalisation 
laws in place between 1999 and 2012, and they are thus constrained in formal terms to 
channel what efforts they can through existing minority representatives, for example North 
African or Italian origin politicians in left wing parties, who have been traditionally able to 
make some impact on local level politics in the city.  
 
The debate on the enfranchisement of foreign residents is a generation-old debate (Jacobs 
1998). There is a compelling case for pushing further the debate. However, it would be more 
accurate to say that it has come to an end after it had reached a climax in 2004. Pushed in the 
back by the European Union, Belgium decided in 2000 to start enfranchising EU foreign 
residents for local and European elections in accordance with supranational European 
regulations. In 2004, a heated debate followed between pro-enfranchisement political parties, 
mainly Francophones, and Flemish parties overall very reluctant to the proposal, with a 
noticeable hostile position from the party of the Prime Minister. Both camps managed to 
reach a pragmatic agreement on a law extending local political rights to non-EU citizens 
under restrictive conditions. These include the following rules: that the applicant must 
register on the electoral roll; has the right to vote without the right to stand as candidate; 
needs to have five years of permanent residence; and needs to formally sign a written 
commitment to respect the Constitution and European Convention on Human Rights, etc.  
 
While European non-national residents and newly naturalised Belgians have gained access to 
substantial political rights, the case of non-naturalised non-Europeans was resolved 
unsatisfactorily and there is only very little probability that the debate will come back centre-
stage. The 2004 bargain as an episode marked the twilight of any public debate on the issue 
and pushed away the question of political rights from a focus on the conditions of access to 
one on the efficacy and effectiveness of political rights in the political process. Between 2000 
and 2015, Belgium has organised nation-wide elections at various level of powers more than 
once every two years. It is in this context that observers have witnessed the increasing 
number of minority voters and candidates (Rea et al. 2010). Despite the institutional opening, 
several shortcomings were observed. During the elections of 2006, where non-European 
11 
 
citizens were enfranchised for the first time, as well as 2012, there was little enthusiasm 
among these foreign residents to register to vote (less than 15% did) (Lafleur 2013).  
 
The politics of administration and welfare ÔsolidarityÕ 
 
Belgian immigration policy as a set of issues, is an inherently problematic area, given that 
competencies over different aspects of border control, naturalisation, immigration, social 
welfare, education, housing and cultural policy were distributed to different levels of the 
polity in the federal reforms. It is clear that immigration-related concerns were not at all high 
on the agenda when the new federal arrangements were made, and this oversight is now 
beginning to make itself felt in the tensions these inconsistencies generate.  
 
In formal terms, immigration and naturalisation policy is still one of the clear areas which 
remains at federal level: a statement of the Belgian stateÕs sovereignty over the boundaries of 
its national jurisdiction. What this in fact means in the current European situation is of course 
strongly compromised by the Belgian involvement in the Schengen agreement and its central 
role in the building of a new European immigration regime and international policies, that 
were bolstered in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. 
At this level, the Belgian state has indeed seen best to devolve its responsibility over these 
free movement and control issues to a common supra-national level, where immigration 
control becomes more a matter of coordinated bureaucratic and police cooperation and the 
tracking of the movement of illegals and third country national (Martiniello and Rea 1999). 
 
Most integration policies, however, fall to regional level powers; despite the fact that it is the 
linguistic communities which have powers and finances over cultural policy, some social 
policy, and education. Welfare state administration itself remains also more in the province of 
the regional authorities. This confusion of powers leads to very unclear outcomes (Corijn and 
al, 2009, Xhardez, 2016). It is in fact local commune administration and policing, for 
example, who hold the real practical powers over implementing residency and naturalisation 
requirements. This in turn may enable difference in treatment and behaviour of different 
Brussels communes over these questions. Some communes practiced a de facto Ôrefus 
dÕinscriptionÕ as a way of curbing or blocking immigrant registration and financial claims, 
although this has been challenged as illegal in the courts. The exclusion of groups with a 
precarious or unofficial status is here felt at its strongest. The practice of bureaucratic and 
police administration in the city often inscribe an informal politics of belonging, where 
offices and individuals may enforce their own judgements on who to admit or not (see 
Crowley 1999). This problem is heightened by the fact that practices can easily differ across 
communes and are thus often arbitrary and protected from proper scrutiny by the high level of 
administrative autonomy given to communes and their individual police forces. One 
consequence of this can be dissuading immigrants to rely on state benefits and coverage, even 
when they are legally entitled (Foblets et al 2004). And this itself pushes them to look to their 
own informal ties and social networks as a kind of alternative.  
 
The politics of language, education and culture 
 
There has been a long-standing difference in ideological orientation of Flemish and Walloons 
over the right normative model of integration of immigrants (Blommaert 1998). Historically, 
the Walloons have always looked more to the individualist French republican model, and the 
Flemish have been closer to Anglo and Dutch ideas of group-based multiculturalism (Adam, 
2013). Brussels, meanwhile, seems more oriented towards a multicultural vision, an 
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inevitability perhaps given the large numbers of non-assimilating foreigners resident in the 
city. Brussels, indeed, is now an unlikely site for traditional assimilation to any unitary idea 
of Belgian culture; indeed, one of the hallmarks of life there is how little anyone needs to 
assimilate to ÔBelgian-nessÕ. This tendency is viewed with deep suspicion by Francophones, 
who suspect that under the guise of multicultural Brussels Ð particularly the promotion of 
English as neutral, third language Ôfor allÕ Ð there is a plot afoot to reverse the French 
orientation of the capital.  
 
Among cultural questions, education is especially problematic because of the costs of keeping 
a dual system running in Brussels, when a better solution would be to incorporate all resident  
foreigners and Belgians into a common bilingual structure, in which the teaching of English 
played a bigger role (van Parijs, 2013). The EU elites here plays a negatively destabilising 
role, because of their tendency to move out of the city, not to participate in any of its public 
institutions, and to generally go (expensively) private in education. This again only 
perpetuates social boundaries and linguistic divisions between different groups, who literally 
never have to come into contact with one another.  
 
Culture, however, can become a powerful vector for political interests. The exclusionary 
tendencies of formal political practice and competences, have forced immigrants to mobilise 
interests in other ways, some of which have been strongly encouraged by the ad hoc and 
uncoordinated efforts of different Francophone and Flemish authorities seeking to promote 
positive strategies towards immigrant groups (thereby, of course, capturing the issue for their 
sphere of influence). Hence, immigrant groups have found themselves in a very strong 
position when bargaining for special cultural funding, linguistic provisions, educational 
allowances, and cultural support - especially from the minority Flemish side most keen to 
promote its contacts and image with the immigrant communities in Brussels. For example, 
during the last decade several initiatives (Manifesto, Aula Magna, BruXsel, Les Etats 
Gnraux de Bruxelles) led by young cultural entrepreneurs, intellectuals and artists from 
both sides of the Flemish-Francophone linguistic divide have sought to work out and 
reinterpret this Brussels identity (Nassaux 2011). They did so by deliberately working to 
overcome the boundaries of the classic Belgian ideological and bureaucratic wrangling. Their 
common point was to assert a new public face for Brussels made up of multilingual and 
multicultural identities. One the distinctive outgrowths of this has also been the very high 
presence and role of organised Islam in Brussels (Bastenier 1998).  
  
The new urban politics 
 
Finally, it is essential to bring into the frame the very real fact that contentious politics in 
Brussels takes on violent and territorial aspects, as a direct consequence of the frustration of 
political efforts in almost other channels. This informal politics of urban life should come as 
no surprise in a city and country where politics between the Flemish and Francophones has 
become so furiously territorial in recent years (Sacco, 2011). In this sense, the Moroccans and 
Turkish are only reproducing the kinds of paying lines that they have learned from the 
dominant political groups in the country. 
 
Firstly, immigrant groups have secured political power in certain communes of the city, 
through gaining some control over the public housing stock in particular areas where there is 
a strong immigrant concentration. Through such spatial concentration, and the kinds of dense 
networks of social cooperation and informal ties that this enables, a source of genuine local 
political power has built up that of course does not get registered in any official public way. 
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This can go so far as to pressurise local white Belgian residents out of certain areas; it builds 
on the religious and economic opportunities offered by the unconventional non-western forms 
of social and political organisation which are allowed to flourish in these pockets of the city. 
 
The second and more dramatic symptom of this tendency, has been the political use of social 
disorder. These issues go back to the 1990s. Whatever was spontaneous about the famous 
race riots of Brussels in the summer of 1991 was certainly different second and third time 
round in 1997, by which time these groups had learned that a strategic political disorder can 
go along way in securing a fast political response from local authorities in terms of cultural 
and social funding and the attraction of political attention. Of course, one side of this 
pathological development is the ever closer involvement of policing and security forces in the 
civil administration of difficult Ôinner cityÕ zones, something from which the more radical 
militant religious and political elements draw power in binary relation. This tendency in 
communes such as Anderlecht has been particularly destructive of attempts of cultural and 
social organisations to build a path toward more constructive political and social form of 
integration. Once again, structural factors block the essential involvement of local actors at 
the conventional political level, and progressive initiatives become prey to this kind of 
dtournement when they find a more conflictual strategic line is a faster way of getting what 
they want. 
 
These ongoing conflicts are part of the background that led to a deterioration of social 
relations and tensions that created the context for an even sharper radicalisation of Muslim 
youth in the 2000s. The global geo-political context of conflict in the Middle East, major 
urban terrorist attacks in other cities, and the Òwar on terrorÓ turned some of the most 
historically disadvantaged parts of (mostly) west central Brussels into a hotbed of recruitment 
for political Islam, absent of other channels of constructive social and political incorporation. 
The dangers of this tendency Ð which were by no means inevitable given the intense efforts 
by other social actors to build cultural associations to include alienated youth in the city Ð 
were only made worse by the arrival of the global press en masse after November 2015 and 
their superficial conclusions that it was BrusselsÕ fragmentary nature itself that was causing 
the radicalisation of youth to the ÒJihadiÓ cause.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Est-ce quÕon ne raconte que des histoires belges? We would strongly disagree. The Belgian 
case is still chronically overlooked and understudied in comparative studies of Western 
European politics and society. We hope at least to have sketched a case for why the Belgian 
case should be central to any discussions about multi-level governance, not least because of 
the complex and advanced state which institutional forms of dealing with this fragmentation 
of politics take in this country. As our account shows, the case also offers a fertile ground for 
asking important unasked questions about the degree to which multi-level institutional 
arrangements both enable and exclude groups from participation. If the underlying question is 
one about the democracy or representativeness of these new forms of organising political 
interests and incorporating minority or marginal groups in the polity, then these questions 
should indeed be moved to the forefront of our discussions. We argue that this vision is still 
relevant, but can also be underlined in terms of its futuristic potential for understanding other 
ÒanomalousÓ examples of complex, radically diverse global cities. 
 
Whereas it is not difficult (indeed rather trivial) to show that the concept of multi-level 
governance may apply to the Belgium and Brussels cases, the conclusions from our 
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underlying questions about incorporation and the institutionalisation of unorthodox political 
activities and channels reveal characteristically mixed, double-faced results. Whereas 
political science approaches to multi-level governance tend to begin only with charting the 
interaction of given groups and interests with a particular political opportunity structure 
(Marks and McAdam 1996; McAdam et al 1996) Ð something in other words, which is 
already a social and cultural institutional structure, if not yet a formal political and legal one Ð 
what is interesting in the examples we have discussed is how these protean and shifting 
situations involving different immigrant groups in different contexts in Brussels might be said 
to be largely pre-institutional in nature. That is, they are situations in which no recognisable 
pattern of institutional interaction is yet established, and thereby groups are empowered to 
both shift their own self-definitions and their targets of coalition and cooperation; and hence 
situations in which we can observe the formation of the actual identities and interests of 
groups, as they are socialised by the political system to take up certain places in the given 
political order (Pizzorno 1986; Bourdieu 1980; Dobry 1986).  
 
What is substantially different about the multi-level situation found in Belgium Ð to one in 
which groups are being incorporated into a unitary traditional national state, and its 
conventional channels of party political participation, law, and state governance Ð is that the 
socialisation process that goes on in a multi-level situation does not necessarily lead to the 
ordered integration of these groups into the polity. Immigrants, in other words, do not become 
citizens like everyone else. This confounds theories of incorporation rooted either in the 
national citizenship-centred idiom of T.H.Marshall or French republicanism, which can see 
no other path for the progressive mechanisms of state building, and democratic representation 
of marginal interests. In the multi-level situation in Belgium, however, something very 
different is happening. In the absence of traditional political incorporation and segmented 
citizenship rights, groups have redoubled their effort to find alternative means of pursuing 
their interests in the Belgian context. Some of these have taken civil forms, others more 
violent ones. Observers of Belgium and Ôpluralisme  la BelgeÕ (Martiniello 1997) have long 
suggested that it is a context which offers clues of EuropeÕs fragmentary future beyond the 
nation-state (Favell and Martiniello 1998; van Parijs 1995). Recent events show how 
significant these clues may prove to be, as the complexity, conflict and (sometimes) violence 
linked to immigrant and cultural diversity in Europe intensifies. In this sense, the ongoing 
situation in Brussels is still a potential precursor of diverse and differentiated urban politics as 
they may well be recognised everywhere someday. In that case, the anomaly would itself 
become a paradigm. Shedding some of the romanticism of still dominant theories of (nation-
state centred) democracy, justice and integration may be the price we have to pay to begin to 
understand what is really going on in ÒanomalousÓ cases such as Brussels. 
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